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THE DIVORCE ACT OF 1949-ONE DECADE LATER
LUVERN RIEKE*
In the legislative session of 1949 a new divorce law was enacted.
Proposed departures from the existing act had been reported to the
State Bar Association.' The objectives and contemplated effects of the
new legislation were discussed in an article immediately after the act
was adopted.' Trouble was predicted
Today, with ten years of experience under the act and in light of 172
reported opinions dealing with it,4 it seems appropriate to see what has
occurred. The objective of this review is to identify, by placing to-
gether the related decisions of the Washington court, trends which
have appeared and significant policies which have been established. It
is not the purpose of the reviewer to subject these opinions to extensive
criticism nor to question the wisdom of announced policies. The
article is essentially a report. It is hoped that its possible value to the
practicing lawyer is reason enough for its existence.
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AND DEFENSES
Several changes in the prior law concerning grounds for divorce were
made by adoption of the new act. The most significant alterations,
which are now found in RCW 26.08.020, were: 1) the addition of the
lack of capacity to consent to marriage by reason of "want of legal
age or a sufficient understanding"' to the prior ground dealing with
force or fraud; 2) the reshaping of the ground based upon a five-year
separation; and 3) the provision that insanity of the defendant spouse
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
'Reports of the committee to the bar may be found at 22 WASH. L. REV. 17 (1947),
and 23 WASH. L. REv. 320 (1948).
2 Kaiser, The Divorce Law of 1949, 24 WASH L. REv. 123 (1949).
3 Marsh, The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act: Sections 20 and 21 of the Divorce
Act of 1949, 24 WASH. L. REv. 259 (1949).
4 The case count will vary with the bias of the person doing the counting. For this
review only cases dealing with the decree of divorce, annulment, nullity and separate
maintenance have been included. No attempt has been made to report related problems
in community property, adoption, juvenile matters or, with a few exceptions, conflict
of laws even though a divorce may have been indirectly involved. The conflict prob-
lems have been ably and recently discussed. Stumberg, The Migratory Divorce, 33
WASH. L. REv. 331 (1958) ; Stumberg, Foreign Ex Parte Divorces and Local Claims
to Alimony, 34 WASH. L. REv. 15 (1959).
r "Legal age" is not defined. It could mean: (a) majority; (b) the age at which
a license to marry may be obtained without parental consent; (c) or with parental
consent; (d) the common law age of consent, 14 and 12 years for the boy and girl
respectively; (e) or even the age above which, at common law, the marriage was
voidable but not void-usually regarded as age seven. If, as seems likely, the prior
cases dealing with annulment for non-age are applicable in the interpretation of this
section, the ages of 14 and 12 would be indicated. See, In re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41,
100 Pac. 159 (1909), which is still law in Washington.
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should, in some instances, be the sole ground available to the'plaintiff.
Other amendments were minor in nature and have not produced litiga-
tion.' There were no new provisions dealing with defenses except the
insanity complication mentioned above. However, the reported opin-
ions have produced a few surprises concerning both defenses and
grounds for relief.
Perhaps the major change came with the case of Saville v. Saville,.
an action brought to annul a marriage for fraud. The trial court
granted the relief sought and the prosecuting attorney appealed.8 The
court decided that, as between divorce and annulment, and where
grounds for divorce exist, divorce is the exclusive relief available. Al-
though the court declined to hold that annulment as a remedy for
voidable marriages no longer exists in Washington, this is the result
for all practical purposes.'
Reformation of the statute dealing with a five-year separation as
grounds for divorce was desirable because of earlier cases holding that
there must be an "injured party," that is, that someone must have been
at fault 10 The legislative remedy attempted was to delete all reference
to "injured party" in the subsection (but not in the introductory sen-,
tence of the section itself which refers to the "following reasons"-i.e.,
grounds) and to add the words "without regard to fault in the separa-
tion." The controlling case, to date, is Harp v. Harp."' It decides that
the parties need not have separated with the intent or the purpose of
obtaining grounds for divorce, and that the "statute is very broad in
its scope and is couched in plain and unambiguous language." Still,
not every separation for five years provides a ground for divorce, for
in some instances circumstances may be "such that the courts must say
that the legislature did not intend the statute should apply ...." What
6 Imprisonment in a federal penal institution was added to the prior provision which
mentioned only a state prison. Habitual drunkenness and so-called nonsupport, previ-
ously one ground, are now stated separately.
7 44 Wn2d 793, 271 P.2d 432 (1954).
8 The prosecuting attorney received authority to appeal by RCW 26.08.080, in part
new legislation in 1949, which overturned Lee v. Lee, 19 Wash. 335, 53 Pac. 349 (1898),
holding that the prosecutor was not a party and could not appeal.
9The court suggested that annulment may still be possible concerning certain mar-
riages prohibited by statute, citing RCW 26.04.030 which deals with marriage of
habitual criminals, insane, or diseased persons. The difficulty with this suggestion is
that concealment of such conditions would be fraudulent, thus a grounds for divorce
and governed by Saville. If no fraud exists these defects have not normally been cause
for annulment. The court also cites two illustrative cases, but one was clearly a fraud
case, like Saville, and the other a "want of sufficient understanding" matter now cov-
ered by the divorce statute.
10 Pierce v. Pierce, 120 Wash. 411, 208 Pac. 49 (1922) ; McGarry v. McGarry, 181
Wash. 689, 44 P.2d 816 (1935).
1143 Wn.2d. 821, 823, 824, 264 P.2d 276, 277, 278 (1953).
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these special circumstances may be is not indicated. It has been held
that the existence of a separate property agreement, and the request by
the defending wife for separate maintenance in lieu of divorce, will not
preclude use of this section. 2 There is as yet no firm indication of
what the court would say about a five-year separation under the pro-
visions of a separate maintenance decree. It would seem that the
ground for divorce should be available, but the question is open.
Continued reliance upon cruelty and personal indignities as ground
for divorce under the new act was of course expected. At times the
court has reiterated its position that incompatibility, unhappiness, and
general dissatisfaction with the marriage do not constitute cruelty, 13
nor does a showing of disagreement concerning religious 4 or political 5
belief alone establish this statutory ground. Frequently these com-
ments are made in the easy cases-where the other spouse is granted
relief anyway ---and by and large the court has been quite content to
affirm the finding and conclusion of trial courts that cruelty or per-
sonal indignities were adequately shown.' Although the statute re-
quires the decree be granted "for cause distinctly stated in the com-
plaint," ' 8 a general allegation that "through incompatibility of tem-
perament, plaintiff has been the victim of mental cruelty" was found
sufficient, at least where the defendant, by defaulting and failing to
demur, waived his right to attack the sufficiency of the pleading. 9 The
crucial point for counsel to keep in mind is that the test for cruelty is
subjective rather than objective.
It is easy to establish that a physical beating of one spouse by the other
is cruel treatment per se; it is much harder to determine whether any
particular language or attitude amounts to cruel treatment per se. The
determinative test as to whether or not a divorce should be granted,
therefore, is not the words used or attitude adopted, but rather their
effect upon the aggrieved party.20
12 Graham v. Graham, 38 Wn.2d 796, 232 P.2d 100 (1951); Morse v. Morse, 42
W¥n.2d 229, 254 P.2d 720 (1953).
12 Metcalf v. Metcalf, 50 Wn.2d 167, 310 P.2d 254 (1957).
14 Mertens v. Mertens, 38 Wn.2d 55, 227 P.2d 724 (1951).
15 Donaldson v. Donaldson, 38 Wn.2d 748, 231 P.2d 607 (1951).
16 Best v. Best, 48 Wn.2d, 252, 292 P.2d 1061 (1956).
1" Guiles v. Guiles, 41 Wn.2d 377, 249 P.2d 368 (1952); Roberts v. Roberts, 51
Wn.2d 499, 319 P.2d 545 (1957); Blakey v. Blakey, 51 Wn.2d 404, 318 P.2d 958
(1957) ; Short v. Short, 154 Wash. Dec. 287, 340 P.2d 168 (1959).
is RCW 26.08.110.
19 Moody v. Moody, 47 Wn.2d 397 at 406, 288 P.2d 229 (1955). Justice Finley, con-
curring, expressed the opinion that the pleading would not have been demurrable at
all. "[T]he language of the complaint.., accorded reasonable and ordinary interpreta-
tion . . . provides adequate notice . . . that cruelty on the part of defendant husband
was urged. .... "
20 Metcalf v. Metcalf, 50 Wn.2d 167, 170, 310 P.2d 254, 257, (1957).
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Under this test, verbal abuse, indifference, and public humiliation
which "caused defendant great mental anguish and suffering" is cru-
elty.2 Also under this category is a husband's deliberate and pro-
longed teasing and criticism of a wife, known by him to be of a sensi
tive nature, when her life is thereby rendered burdensome.2 In this
connection the court's recent statement concerning proof of nervous-
ness or emotional distress, even though appearing in a custody dispute
rather than on the effect of cruelty, is well worth noting." It is entirely
possible that this "medical question" should now be established by the
use of expert opinion.
Abandonment as a divorce ground received passing attention in one
case,24 and a helpful discussion of the "neglect or refusal of the hus-
band to make suitable provision for his family" appears in Baselt v.
Baselt.25 This opinion should be enough to demonstrate that "neglect '
involves deliberate conduct, that "suitable" is a relative term depend-
ing upon the circumstances of each case, and that the fact that the wife
can and does support herself, though with some difficulty, does not
relieve the husband of his obligation to her. Adultery has also been
relied upon, with the argument usually centering around the question
of proof. The Barrinuevo case"6 emphasizes the rule that in civil cases,
only a preponderance of evidence is required and furnishes an outline
of what proof will suffice.
Because the act permits a divorce to be awarded to "either or both"
of the parties, it frequently happens that both spouses seek the decree.
Repeatedly disappointed spouses have appealed from a denial of their
prayer even though a divorce was granted to the other litigant. These
appeals have required the court to explain on numerous occasions that,
"Respondent has not cross-appealed. The parties will, therefore, remain
divorced regardless of whether or not the respondent should have been
granted the divorce. If the court erred in this regard, it is not prejudi-
cial." In a case where both parties were awarded a divorce, the wife's
contention on appeal that the decree should have been given to her
21 Fallin v. Fallin, 154 Wash. Dec. 445, 340 P2d 791 (1959).
22 Detjen v. Detjen, 40 Wn.2d 479, 244 P.2d 238 (1952).
28 Johnson v. Johnson, 50 Wn2d 56, 308 P.2d 967 (1957).
24 Guiles v. Guiles, 41 Wn.2d 377, 249 P.2d 368 (1952).
25 37 Wn2d 461, 224 P2d 631 (1950).26 Barrinuevo v. Barrinuevo 47 Wn.2d 296, 287 P.2d 349 (1955).
2 7 Akns v. Akns, 51 Wn.2d 887, 888, 322 P.2d 872.
Schilling, 42 Wn.2d 105, 253 P.2d 952 (1953); Smith Smith, 45 Wn.2d 672, 277
P.2d 339 (1954) ; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 46 Wn2d 373, 281 P2d 856 (1955) ; Potter
V. Potter, 46 Wn.2d 526, 282 P.2d 1052 (1955) ; and Applegate v. Applegate, 53 Wn.2d
635, 335 P.2d 595 (1959).
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alone because this would establish the husband's fault, a factor she
considered significant in relation to property division and alimony,
proved unavailing." Nor was a party who had been awarded a divorce
permitted to show that it was awarded on the wrong grounds. 9 Per-
haps the court itself is responsible for these repeated assignments of
error. In Saffer v. Saffer ° a husband who, with his wife, was granted
a divorce was able to obtain an order directing the trial court to review
the award to the wife. The reason was that the wife had complained
for a divorce upon the basis of the husband's alleged "abnormal sexual
conduct," an accusation of crime, which the court felt was not ade-
quately established. While this fact pattern may not occur frequently,
one is left wondering what other arguments might prove attractive to
the court. Legally this problem may be something of a tempest in a
teacup, but the frequency of appeal indicates that litigants are prone
to take a serious view about which spouse is awarded the decree.
Cases decided during the period under review have also added to
the fund of authority concerning defenses to a complaint for divorce.
The new defense created by statute, insanity of the defendant as an
exclusive ground of divorce, came into play in Wolfe v. Wolfe.' It
was there held that cruelty could not be the basis for a divorce when
"the defendant was under an adjudication of insanity during the two-
year period alleged in the complaint as the time when her cruel and
inhuman treatment rendered plaintiff's life burdensome." 2 However,
in this case the mental condition had existed two years, which is the
time period required by the statute to establish the chronic mania or
dementia as a ground for divorce. Does this suggest that insanity of
the defendant, existing at the time of the action and during the period
when the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred, but of less than two
years duration, is not available as a defense? The Wolfe case is
obviously not a holding on this point."
28 Patrick v. Patrick, 43 Wn.2d 139, 260 P.2d 878 (1953).29 Murphy v. Murphy, 44 Wn.2d 737, 270 P.2d 808 (1954).30 42 Wn.2d 298, 254 P.2d 746 (1953).
s142 Wn.2d 834, 258 P.2d 1211 (1953).
3
2 An adjudication of insanity is not required. The statute provides only that the
condition be "established by competent medical testimony." RCW 26.08.020(10).
s3 Perhaps it is clear that insanity is no defense unless it has existed two years, but
it does not seem clear to the reviewer. The court alludes to the fact that insanity was
a defense at common law. Is it still, independently of the statute, in testing the wrong-
ful quality of the defendant's act? Cobb v. Cobb, 19 Wn.2d 697, 143 P.2d 856 (1943),
the case which announced the rule "corrected" by the 1949 amendment, held only that
a person presently insane could be sued for divorce for acts of cruelty committed prior
to the time insanity commenced and which could not be attributed to the mental con-
dition. If wrongful acts cannot be commited by an insane person, why the reliance on
RCW 26.08.020(10) in the Wolfe case? Enough ambiguity seems present here, as
[VoL. 35
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Recrimination as a defense had almost disappeared from Washing-
ton law at the time the new divorce law was enacted. The court had
said, "[the] doctrine is that a person seeking a divorce must be inno-
cent of any substantial wrongdoing to the other party of the same
nature as that of which complaint is made. [Emphasis by the
court]" 4 The virtually complete abolition of the defense may now have
been accomplished. In an action by a wife who complained of cruelty,
where the husband established that the wife had also abused him
verbally and physically, the trial court denied a divorce. Reversing,
the supreme court said the defense of recrimination had no application
as the husband had employed excessive violence and thus "the acts
cannot be held similar within the contemplation of this doctrine." 
85
Nonetheless, it is possible that this defense, ejected through the front
door, has unobtrusively re-entered through the rear under the new
name of provocation. In the case last cited the husband argued un-
successfully that his conduct was justified because provoked by the
wife.
However, in Short v. Short" a wife's prayer for separate mainte-
nance was denied because her conduct provoked the husband into
leaving home, thus making the ground of abandonment unavailable to
her. In a very similar case the trial court, having found "that both
parties are to blame for the situation ... ," granted separate mainte-
nance anyway. The supreme court, although reversing for other reasons,
said: "The findings in this case ... show that the appellant did not
abandon the respondent, that he was not guilty of cruel treatment or
personal indignities, and that her dissatisfaction was no more his fault
than her own." '7
Provocation assumes that conduct, otherwise wrongful, is not ground
for relief when justified by preceding wrong of the plaintiff. Recrimi-
nation assumes that wrongful conduct, otherwise grounds, cannot be
used to obtain relief when balanced against equally wrongful conduct
of the plaintiff. The doctrines can be distinguished upon a cause-and-
effect basis, but in substance and usefulness as a defense to divorce are
they very far apart?
well as in the report of the drafting committee, 23 WASH. L. REv. 320 (1948), the sub-
sequent explanatory comment, Kaiser, The Divorce Law of 1949, 24 WASH L. REv. 123
(1949) at 124, and in the general policy question, to require further interpretation by
the court.
'4' Hokamp v. Hokamp, 32 Wn.2d 593, 596, 203 P.2d 357, 359 (1949).
"5 Schmidt v. Schmidt, 51 Wn.2d 753, 757, 321 P.2d 895, 897 (1958).
30 154 Wash. Dec. 287, 340 P2d 168 (1959).
37 Manzer v. Manzer, 154 Wash. Dec. 801, 344 P2d 212 (1959).
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Unlike recrimination, the conditional forgiveness known as condona-
tion has been successfully used during the past decade. A reconcilia-
tion occurring after the pleadings were completed, but before trial,
enabled a wife to obtain a dismissal of the action despite the fact that
the husband had cross-complained and protested the dismissal." It is
well settled that a breach of conjugal kindness, which need not be
grounds for divorce in itself, revives the former basis for complaint. 9
The party asserting the defense has the burden of proof. A mere
showing of continued cohabitation, which might establish condonation
of a specific act, does not prove forgiveness of a continuing course of
abusive treatment." Another point relating to condonation was dis-
cussed by the court in Saffer v. Saffer.4 ' The fact that a past wrong, in
this case adultery by the wife, has been fully condoned and never re-
vived does not preclude consideration of the act in determining fitness
for an award of custody. There are still some annoying details to be
resolved in relation to this defense,4 but its general use seems clear
and consistent.
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND THE ORDERS THEREIN
Concerning the matters about which parties seeking a divorce are
most inclined to dispute; namely, the disposition of property and the
provisions relating to the custody and support of children, the focal
part of the divorce act is RCW 26.08.110. In this section the divorce
must find both the grant of power to enter, modify, and enforce neces-
sary orders and the standards or guides for the exercise of such au-
thority. It is a crucial section, and the great majority of cases decided
since the adoption of the act have concerned one or more of its provi-
sions. Most of the language in the section is not new, but consists of
fragments from several sections in the pre-1949 divorce statute. Un-
fortunately the patchwork was not skillfully accomplished. How much
the deficiencies of the statute have contributed to the bulk of divorce
38 McFerran v. McFerran, 47 Wn2d 236, 287 P.2d 142 (1955).
39 Rentel v. Rentel, 39 Wn.2d 729, 238 P.2d 389 (1951) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 47
Wn.2d 224, 287 P2d 139 (1955).
40 Murray v. Murray, 38 Wn.2d 269, 229 P.2d 309 (1951).
4142 Wn.2d 298, 254 P.2d 746 (1953).
42 A problem yet to be resolved deals with condonation after the pleading and a
breach of conjugal kindness thereafter, all before the time of trial. Clearly the revived
ground for divorce is available, but what about the ninety day waiting period and
other procedural details? In the absence of a motion to dismiss it would seem point-
less to insist that the action had been terminated and must be commenced again. How-
ever to proceed without additional notice to the opposing litigant, or without dis-
closure of the circumstances to the court and waiting out an additional ninety days
after the breach of conjugal kindness, might be to invite a subsequent petition for
vacation of the decree. It may be that a registered letter of notice, with a copy placed
in the file, would provide the needed protection.
[VOL. 35
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litigation is a matter of conjecture, but the fact of contribution is be-
yond dispute.
There are problems of obtaining, appealing or modifying, and en-
forcing these several types of awards which are common to the entire
section. Hence a decision dealing with alimony may be useful as
authority for a similar point in a property division, child custody or
support problem. This fungibility has limits however, and it has
seemed advisable to deal with each area individually. The task of
cross-application is left to the reader.
A mmoNY
The common law had no alimony concept for the simple reason that
it had no divorces. Equity, with its inherent power to award separate
maintenance, had no problem with alimony because. it simply ordered
specific performance of the husband's established legal obligation to
support his wife and family. Divorce powers are the product of legis-
lation, and alimony is or is not available depending solely upon the
words and the judicially interpreted legislative intent of the statute.
In 1955 the court was asked to hold that the new divorce act makes no
provision for an award of alimony and, as a consequence, that alimony
was not available in Washington. This the court declined to do.4" The
power does exist and alimony may be ordered, although not in a default
decree where no alimony has been prayed for in the complaint."'
The statute requires the divorce court to make disposition of the
property of the parties, a phrase which now includes authorization to
award alimony. The award is to be in light of the respective merits of
the spouses, the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the
source of acquisition of the property, and the burdens imposed for the
benefit of the children. The disposition "shall appear just and equita-
ble" and may deal with separate as well as community assets. Strug-
gling to give more precision to this general standard, the court has in-
43 Loomis v. Loomis, 47 Wn.2d 468, 288 P.2d 235 (1955). The contention was that
the power to award alimony, expressly mentioned in the pre-1949 statute dealing with
orders in the interlocutory decree, had been repealed-which it was--and no new power
had been granted. The court found alimony power in the provision enabling the court
to make a disposition of the property of the parties, and by implication from the ex-
press authority to modify "such decree" in regard to alimony. Two judges dissented.
See Brown, Alimony in Washington: A Note to the Legislature, 26 WAsH. L. Ray.
135 (1951).
44 State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 36 Wn.2d 868, 220 P.2d 1081 (1950).
A dissenting minority of three judges argued that alimony is always a possible inci-
dent of divorce and that to award such relief, even though not requested in the com-
plaint, would not deprive the defaulting husband of due process. For the same prob-lem in connection with custody, see Sheldon v. Sheldon, 47 Wn.2d 699, 289 P.2d 335
(1955), which supports the majority opinion of the Adams case.
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dicated that the trial judge must equate the need of the wife45 against
the ability of the husband to pay, exercising his informed discretion
and recognizing-but not being controlled by-such additional factors
as fault.46 The husband must be left enough of his salary to live on."
The existence of a wide disparity in the earning ability of the spouses
does not alone justify awarding alimony to the wife. However, need is
a relative thing and a woman who before the divorce occupied a rela-
tively affluent position in life should be continued in something com-
parable to the life to which she had become accustomed.,8 In recogni-
tion of the variable nature of the husband's ability to provide alimony,
parties have attempted to accomplish flexibility by awards which are
in part a fixed periodic amount and in part a percentage of the hus-
band's income, in excess of a specified amount, as reported by him for
federal income tax purposes. This device has received the approbation
of the court.4" Problems have arisen in this connection only because
of a failure to specify whether such tax provisions as exemptions, de-
ductions, spread-back privilege, and income-splitting with a new
spouse were intended. These difficulties can be avoided by careful
draftsmanship in preparing separation agreements and proposed orders
for the court.
Careful preparation of documents could also assist materially in
avoiding a recurrent conundrum-when is an award intended as ali-
mony and when as a division of property?5" There is no well defined
standard which will resolve this problem when general language has
been employed. There have been some hints offered during the past
45 Wills v. Wills, 50 Wn.2d 439, 312 P.2d 661 (1957). It was held error to award
a college trained wife, younger than the husband and in good health, $200 of the hus-
band's $500 monthly income.
46 Patrick v. Patrick, 43 Wn.2d 139, 260 P.2d 878 (1953).
47 Hilsenberg v. Hilsenberg, 154 Wash. Dec. 790, 344 P.2d 214 (1959). A husband
who earned about $17,000 annually could get along with approximately $4,500 when
there was a substantial property award to him, and his wife and five children needed
the $9,600 annual payment ordered for their support.
48 Young v. Young, 47 Wn.2d 497, 288 P.2d 463 (1955). A majority of five judges
limited the alimony to a three year period or until the wife should remarry. Two con-
curring judges set forth the concept of need as related to the former station in life.
One judge dissented from the award of any alimony. This decision also discusses the
case of Lockhart v. Lockhart, 145 Wash. 210, 259 Pac. 385 (1927), a case which estab-
lishes the general principle that a wife should not be given a "perpetual lien" on the
husband's future income, the purpose of alimony being only to support the wife during
a transitory period long enough to enable her to provide her own support. The Lock-
hart case, the rationale of which appears to be the basis for the majority opinion, has
had a stormy history hut has not been overruled.
49 Prescott v. Prescott, 52 Wn.2d 769, 329 P.2d 200 (1958) ; Berry v. Berry, 50
Wn.2d 158, 310 P.2d 223 (1957).
ro Whether an award is for alimony or is a division of property is an intensely
significant issue. Tax consequences, modification, enforcement, and interstate recog-
nition are illustrative of problems that involve the distinction.
[VOL. 35
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decade which may be of some value. The Washington court felt that
alimony was intended by the trial court's award of $7,500 to be paid
in four equal installments to the wife, where both parties, each married
previously, brought property with them to the second marriage and
executed an antenuptial separate property agreement." The decision
was influenced, among other factors, by the absence of any language in
the decree dealing with the property settlement already accomplished
by the contract. If the court finds that the sum the wife is awarded is
the amount previously loaned to the husband by the wife, it is possible
to say the award is a property division.2 The result in the preceding
two illustrations may have been predictable. A more difficult case in-
volved a property settlement agreement obligating the husband to
place farm land in trust and to permit the trustee to pay the proceeds
from the farm to the wife. The agreement provided that it was "fur-
ther agreed... that the above provision shall be in lieu of a property
settlement, allowance for alimony and support for the [wife] and...
minor children... ." All other property was conveyed to the husband.
The court suggested the following test:
Generally, alimony has several distinct characteristics. It must have
as its purpose the support and maintenance of the wife .... Usually,
it is an allowance of periodical payments, but it may be in the form of
a lump sum. Normally, alimony ceases upon the death of either of the
parties. It is usually provided for by an order of the court incorporated
in a decree of divorce. It is generally in the form of money, and pay-
ment of a specific sum is required.
However, it appears that no one of these characteristics is conclusive
in distinguishing alimony payments from property settlement pay-
ments. The use of the words "alimony" or "support and maintenance"
are not always necessary."'
The husband, having suffered serious financial reverses and earning
only $400 a month while the wife's trust income had reached $2,000 a
month, petitioned for a modification. The court found the agreement
to be a property division, not subject to modification. The fact that
the husband was not required to pay a specific sum, having no obliga-
tion if the farm produced no income and an increasingly larger obliga-
tion as the farm continued to prosper, was apparently determinative. 4
51 Platts v. Platts, 45 Wn2d 853, 278 P.2d 679 (1954).52 Corrigeux v. Corrigeux, 37 Wn2d 403, 224 P.2d 343 (1950).53 Valaer v. Valaer, 45 Wn2d 565, 570, 571, 277 P.2d 326, 329 (1954).
54 The alimony awards based in part on a percentage of the husband's taxable
income, note 49 supra, can be distinguished. There is in them a minimum obligation in
any event.
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In a similar case, Millheisler v. Millheisler5 the court reached the
same result.
Modification problems dealing with alimony have not been difficult
nor frequent. There must be a showing that conditions have changed
since the previous determination. One wife met this requirement by
showing that the terms of a separate property agreement, incorporated
into the decree, were unworkable. 6 Usually however, the change in
circumstances will be directed toward the basic "need of the wife-
ability of the husband to pay" formula and (assuming a husband who
can pay) the wife prevails when she proves increased needs57 and loses
when she does not.5" One opinion, modifying an order of the trial court
reducing the total obligation of a husband for child support and ali-
mony, had this warning dictum:
The present modification order could be construed as, in effect, a can-
cellation of any alimony allowance. Under our decisions, this interpre-
tation of the order would deprive the appellant of any right to modify
or reinstate the alimony provisions in the future, even if need therefor
could be clearly demonstrated.5 9 [Emphasis by the court.]
The court does not cite the decisions upon which this statement is
based. If such a holding has been announced during the period under
review it has not been found, but assuming the accuracy of the obser-
vation the need to fight for the magical one dollar alimony becomes
obvious.
Some of the foregoing decisions have discussed enforcement of ali-
mony awards, but no new developments have been noted. Contempt
citations of course are available," as are normal judgment remedies as
the installments accrue. All else that need be said on this topic appears
in the discussion of enforcement of property division awards.
PROPERTY DIVISION
The power to divide the spouses' property upon divorce is derived
from the same statutory words, "disposition of the property of the
parties," as is alimony. The same is true of the statutory standards
established to guide the trial court in its exercise of discretion. There
is one important distinction: "Such decree as to alimony ... may be
modified, altered and revised.... Such decree, however, as to the...
55 43 Wn.2d 282, 261 P.2d 69 (1953).56 Heuchan v. Heuchan, 38 Wn.2d 207, 228 P.2d 470 (1951).
57Warning v. Warning, 40 Wn.2d 903, 247 P.2d 249 (1952).
58 Gordon v. Gordon, 44 Wn.2d 222, 266 P.2d 786 (1954).
59 Hanson v. Hanson, 47 Wn.2d 439, 446, 287 P.2d 879, 883 (1955).
60 State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 36 Wn.2d 868, 220 P.2d 1081 (1950).
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division of property shall be final... subject only to the right to ap-
peal."61 [Emphasis added.] As noted in the preceding discussion of
alimony awards, the award of alimony and child support is a factor
directly affecting the manner in which the property division will be
determined.
It is well established that the trial court may divide both separate
and community property and should consider the total assets available
when making its decree.2 Normally the wife's interest should be rec-
ognized by an award of property rather than by simply providing for
her support. 3 The trial judge is possessed of considerable discretion
in this connection and his determination is said to stand unless abuse
of discretion is detected." The wishes of the litigants as expressed in
a property settlement agreement are entitled to careful consideration
and are often persuasive, 5 but such expressed desires do not compel the
court to grant a corresponding decree. 6 - Fault is a relevant factor. 7
In the absence of fault the court has indicated that an unequal distribu-
tion of community property is not appropriate. 8 However, this hold-
ing was quickly distinguished in a decision in which consideration of
additional factors militated "against a mathematically equal distribu-
tion in terms of dollars and cents .... 69
Where mature parties brought separate property to the marriage,
and are divorced after a brief marital relation during which com-
munity acquisitions were expended for costs of living, an award giving
each spouse his or her own property is appropriate." The significance
of source of acquisition is further illuminated by a decision in which the
bulk of property was acquired through the wife and was awarded to
her, the husband being given enough to recognize the value of his
services to the community and the value of improvements made by his
efforts.71 This factor also works in reverse. Even though the parties
have been separated, the frugality of the wife may have been a con-
tributing factor to the husband's success in acquiring wealth and is
61 RCW 26.08.110.
02 Schilling v. Schilling, 42 Wn.2d 105, 253 P.2d 952 (1953).
63 Graham v. Graham, 38 Wn2d 796, 232 P.2d 100 (1951).
64 Aldns v. Aldns, 51 Wn2d 887, 322 P.2d 872 (1958) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 47
Wn.2d 224, 287 P.2d 139 (1955).
65 Short v. Short, 154 Wash. Dec. 287, 340 P.2d 168 (1959).
GG Bernier v. Bernier, 44 Wn.2d 447, 267 P.2d 1066 (1954).67 Browning v. Browning, 46 Wn2d 538, 283 P.2d 125 (1955).68 Wills v. Wills, 50 Wn.2d 439, 312 P2d 661 (1957).
09 Wolfishberg v. Wolfishberg, 51 Wn.2d 103, 107, 316 P.2d 114, 116(1957).
70 Toivonen v. Toivenen, 44 Wn.2d 473, 268 P.2d 456 (1954). It is worth noting
that even in this case the trial court awarded the wife an additional $4,000 and
attorney's fees.
71 Lynch v. Lynch, 38 Wn2d 437, 229 P.2d 885 (1951).
19601
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
entitled to recognition in the division of such property.72 However, the
source of acquisition is but one factor and, as with fault, is not to be
used to the exclusion of other considerations."
It is important that the husband be given enough property, prefer-
ably the type enabling him to continue in the work for which he is
fitted, to safeguard his own welfare."' In furtherance of the policy that
a divorced wife should be required to become self-sustaining as rapidly
as possible, the court has indicated that she should be given cash with
which to start a business, even if the husband must encumber his por-
tion of the award to make this possible.75
The statute requires the divorce court to make a disposition of the
property, and an attempt to award the assets to the spouses as tenants
in common has been held as not being in compliance." Such a decree
leaves the parties in the position they would occupy if no award were
made at all, and the purpose of avoiding future litigation or a partition
action would not be served. However, an award of a home to the
spouses as tenants in common was not questioned in Nelson v. Nelson,"
where the wife and children were to occupy the premises. The court
did indicate that the husband, required to pay a mortgage indebtedness
encumbering the home, was to have a lien in the amount of his pay-
ments "when and if" the home was sold. Perhaps ultimate sale and
division had been ordered in the Nelson case.7" Orders directing a sale
and division of the proceeds have been used where a physical distribu-
tion would be difficult.8" In one such case, the wife protested that the
order to sell an unfinished home was an abuse of discretion because
fair value would not be obtained. She was at least partially rewarded
for her effort. The appellate court ordered that an attempt be made to
sell, but if such efforts proved impracticable the trial court was author-
ized to "issue such order as it deems necessary. . ." No mention was
made in the preceding opinion of the case of High v. High,2 which held
72 Morse v. Morse, 42 Wn.2d 229, 254 P.2d 720 (1953).
73 Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn.2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951).
"4 Patrick v. Patrick, 43 Wn.2d 139, 260 P.2d 878 (1953) ; Lynch v. Lynch, supra
note 71.
75 Atkinson v. Atkinson, 38 Wn.2d 769, 231 P.2d 641 (1951).
76 Bernier v. Bernier, 44 Wn.2d 447, 267 P.2d 1066 (1954).
77 Shaffer v. Shaffer, 43 Wn.2d 629, 262 P.2d 763 (1953).
78 43 Wn.2d 278, 260 P.2d 886 (1953).
79 An order directing sale after two years may have saved an award to spouses as
tenants in common in Henson v. Henson, 47 Wn.2d 866, 289 P.2d 1034 (1955).
80 Hokamp v. Hokamp, 32 Wn.2d 593, 203 P.2d 357 (1949).
81 Murphy v. Murphy, 44 Wn.2d 737, 270 P.2d 808 (1954). The interesting ques-
tion of whether this would authorize modification of a "final" award was not necessary
to discuss. The court, noting the absence of assignment of error, declined to decide
whether the trial court decree failed to make a final disposition.
82-41 Wn.2d 811, 252 P.2d 272 (1953).
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it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order the sale of real
properties which the spouses had purchased prior to marriage but
while living in a meritricious relation, for its speculative worth. The
parties were to be permitted to "hold their undivided half interests in
these separate tracts until such time as a division or other disposition
can be agreed upon or effectuated in a proper proceeding for partition,"
exactly the technique condemned in other opinions.
The court's approval in the High opinion of a California decision
holding that a divorce court "cannot order the sale of property which
the parties hold as tenants in common and require a division of the net
proceeds as in a partition suit" may have been intended to apply only
upon the facts of the case-property acquired during illegal, but good
faith, cohabitation. If physical division is not practical and a division
by sale is in fact not proper, the problem can still be solved by award-
ing the property to one spouse and ordering a sum to be paid to the
other, if necessary by installments, with a lien to secure the perform-
ance.
83
Another problem of some difficulty is whether the award may give
an interest to anyone other than a spouse. It is clear that divorce is
not a liquidation proceeding, like bankruptcy, in which creditors may
be given a direct interest. " Language ordering payment of debts settles
the obligation between the spouses without adding to or detracting
from the rights of the creditor.85 It is also well settled that property
may be placed in trust to accomplish proper support objectives, in-
cluding those which provide for payment of the proceeds for the benefit
of children.8" However, despite earlier cases which apparently ap-
proved or at least did not set aside awards directly to the children, 7
there is reason to believe that no such direct property interest can be
created."s
Sometimes parties forget to place property before the court for divi-
sion. If they have previously divided the property by property settle-
ment contract, approved by the court, no question arises except the
8
3 Potter v. Potter, 46 Wn.2d 526, 282 P.2d 1052 (1955).
8 Arneson v. Arneson, 38 Wn.2d 99, 227 P.2d 1016 (1951). However a community
creditor may apparently be brought in by a spouse for the purpose of attempting to
quiet title in allegedly separate property. Finley v. Finley, 47 Wn.2d 307, 287 P.2d
475 (1955).
85 See the dissenting opinions in Brantley v. Brantley, 154 Wash. Dec. 864, 344
P.2d 731 (1959) ; Decker v. Decker, 52 Wn.2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958).
88 Abel v. Abel, 47 Wn.2d 816, 289 P.2d 724 (1955) ; Valaer v. Valaer, 45 Wn2d
565, 277 P2d 326 (1954).87 Kern v. Kern, 28 Wn2d 617, 183 P2d 811 (1947) ; Cozard v. Cozard, 48 Wash.
124, 92 Pac. 935 (1907).
88 Pick v. Pick, 154 Wash. Dec. 953, 345 P.2d 181 (1959).
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problem of interpretation.89 If nothing is done about the property, the
parties will be left as tenants in common of the community property."
This interest will support a partition action, even in the probate of the
estate of a deceased co-owner.9 However if the court finds that one
tenant in common has misled the other into a detrimental change of
position with reference to the ownership, the relying party will be per-
mitted to quiet title in himself." To establish such an estoppel (the
only solution readily available since adverse possession is difficult to
establish against a co-owner) the claimant must do more than show
his occupancy, improvements, and an increase in value. Compensation
may be given for the improvements, taxes, assessments and similar
items, but the quiet title request will be denied unless the misleading
statements and a detrimental change of position can be shown.93
Insurance policies also constitute property and may be disposed of
by the court.94 If policies are forgotten, the problem discussed above
appears again. In a case of first impression decided during the period
under review, the court was required to determine the consequence of
such an oversight. The policy on the husband's life, naming the wife
as beneficiary, was under familiar Washington law a community ac-
quisition. It follows that the parties were tenants in common after
divorce, but in an interpleader of the named beneficiary and a second
wife of the deceased insured, the court found that the husband had
failed to exercise the power to dispose of his share of the undivided
property and thus had "clearly indicated that he intended ... his for-
mer wife, to be the recipient of his one-half of the proceeds."" In a
case decided only a few months earlier, also a case of first impression,
the court held against the wife, a named beneficiary.96 The case was
not one of a forgotten policy however. The husband had been ex-
pressly awarded the policy by the decree, which had incorporated a
89 Sears v. Rusden, 39 Wn.2d 412, 235 P.2d 819 (1951). Conveyances between the
parties prior to divorce would also be effective even if not expressly adopted by the
court. However in such a case difficulty with title insurance might well be
encountered.
90 This was established years ago by the case of Ambrose v. Moore, 46 Wash. 463,
90 Pac. 588 (1907), a doctrine frequently reaffirmed.
91 Olson v. Roberts, 42 Wn.2d 862, 259 P.2d 418 (1953).
92 Witzel v. Tena, 48 Wn.2d 628, 295 P.2d 1115 (1956).
93 Fritch v. Fritch, 53 Wn.2d 496, 335 P.2d 43 (1959).
94 Silen v. Silen, 44 Wn.2d 884, 271 P.2d 674 (1954) ; Berol v. Berol, 37 Wn.2d
380, 223 P.2d 1055 (1950).
95 Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Perrigo, 47 Wn.2d 291, 295, 287 P.2d 334, 336
(1955). The same reasoning was used in giving the former wife, a named beneficiary,
the total proceeds of insurance on the deceased husband's life against the claim of
the administrator of the deceased's estate for an equal share. Cowan v. Sullivan, 48
Wn.2d 680, 296 P.2d 317 (1956).
96 United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 46 Wn.2d 587, 283 P.2d 119 (1955).
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property settlement agreement. The intent expressed in the contract,
the court found, was to give the husband the wife's interest and ac-
cordingly was as effective to extinguish her claim as an express assign-
ment would have been, despite the husband's failure to change the
beneficiary designation.
ENFORCEMENT OF PROPERTY AwARD
A property settlement agreement or any conveyance accompanying
it, if not made part of an effective judgment, may subsequently be
attacked by a party for fraud or coercion."' A property award of the
court, whether or not incorporating an agreement of the parties, is a
final judgment which may not be modified."8 By statute the division
may be appealed, although an acceptance of payments under the judg-
ment waives the right of appeal with reference to the property award99
and might waive the right of appeal in its entirety.100 The vacation of
a default decree of divorce awarding property is not a modification
however.10' On the other hand a trial court may not, upon remand of
a divorce appealed only as to the custody award, make new orders with
reference to the division of the property nor attempt to restrain the use
of normal means of enforcing such prior judgment."0 2 As with any
normal judgment a property division, ordering the husband to pay the
wife certain money, bears interest after its entry. 03
At the beginning of the decade under review it seemed reasonably
certain that a property award could not be enforced by a contempt
order.'0 In retrospect, it would seem that the prior rule started to fall
with Robinson v. Robinson.'05 Although the court again asserted that,
because of the prohibition of imprisonment for debt in Article I, Sec-
tion 17 of the state constitution, "such decrees, as they relate to the
payment of money... cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings,"
97 Brown v. Brown, 46 Wn.2d 370, 281 P2d 850 (1955).
08 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 43 Wn.2d 111, 260 P.2d 875 (1953) ; Millheisler v.
Millheisler, 43 Wn.2d 282, 261 P.2d 69 (1953).
OuPotter v. Potter, 46 Wn.2d 526, 282 P.2d 1052 (1955).
100 Murray v. Murray, 38 Wn.2d 269, 229 P.2d 309 (1951). At page 273, the court
said: "The general rule in effect in many jurisdictions is that such action constitutes
a waiver of the entire right to appeal the divorce decree. ... Respondent here does not
advance such a broad contention ... [W]ithout deciding the broad question of waiver
as to the entire appeal, we agree with respondent that the assignment of error as to
the property award has now become moot."
101 High v. High, 41 Wn.2d 811, 252 P.2d 272 (1953).
102 Johnson v. Johnson, 53 Wn.2d 107, 330 P2d 1075 (1958).
103 Berol v. Berol, 37 Wn,2d 380, 223 P.2d 1055 (1950).
104 Corrigeaux v. Corrigeaux, 37 Wn.2d 403, 224 P.2d 343 (1950) ; State ex tel.
Foster v. Superior Court, 193 Wash. 99, 74 P.2d 479 (1938).
105 37 Wn.2d 510, 225 P.2d 411 (1950).
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it held that a writ of assistance (not a contempt citation) could be used
to enforce an order of the court directing the former wife to deliver a
document necessary for implementation of the property award. The
theory of compelling obedience to an order of the court appeared again
in Decker v. Decker,' this time to compel a husband to pay a debt
which was secured by a mortgage upon certain real property awarded
to the wife. It was held that contempt was available on the motion of
the wife unless the husband could establish that: (1) he lacked the
means to comply with the order; or, (2) the order had no reasonable
relation to his duty to support the wife or children. A subsequent deci-
sion on similar facts has reaffirmed the reasoning employed in the
Decker case." 7 Although both these decisions were dissented to by
three judges, it would seem that contempt citations are now available
to one who meets the indicated conditions. What remains is the task
of clarifying the standards to be used in determining "the significant
question... whether the provision that the court seeks to enforce by
contempt proceedings, regardless of the name given it, bears a reason-
able relationship to the husband's duty to support his wife and chil-
dren." 0 8 One additional decision must be mentioned in this connection.
In Millheisler v. Millheisler °9 the court found that a property settle-
ment agreement was intended by the parties as a property award, not
as an alimony or support provision, and was therefore not subject to
modification. However, as a contract requiring the execution of docu-
ments by the husband, it could be enforced by a decree of specific
performance."'
CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
RCW 26.08.110 provides basic authority to "make provision for...
the custody ... of the minor children of such marriage." Additional
power to provide for children born during the existence of a marriage
106 52 Wn.2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958), noted in 34 WASH. L. REv. 192 (1959).
1 07 Brantley v. Brantley, 154 Wash. Dec. 864, 344 P.2d 731 (1959). A related
issue arose in Smith v. Smith, 53 Wn.2d 744, 337 P.2d 51 (1959), where an attorney
attempted to use contempt proceedings to collect from the husband the fee awarded
the wife in a divorce action. A writ of prohibition was granted. The husband had not
been specifically ordered to pay the fee. The question of whether the contempt
proceeding would be available to the attorney if there had been an order rather than
only an award was discussed but left undecided.
108 Brantley v. Brantley, supra, at p. 868. It should not be overlooked that the
Robinson case, supra note 105, was a case involving an order to the wife, not directly
related to any support obligation. Note that a contempt proceeding was not available.
109 43 Wn.2d 282, 261 P.2d 69 (1953).
110 Would the same result be reached concerning a contractual promise to make
periodic payments as a property division, or is this rule limited to cases where a
money judgment would be an inadequate remedy? If the husband-obligor had remar-
ried would a judgment be enforceable against the new community? If, for refusal to
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of record later declared void is found in RCW 26.08.060. Other sec-
tions of the act provide for venue in proceedings to modify such
orders, 1 ' the procedure to be followed,"' and for the filing of certified
copies of the records of the original divorce or annulment proceeding
when required by the court hearing a petition for modification." 8 A
number of problems have arisen in connection with these provisions
since the adoption of the act.
Sheldon v. Sheldon"4 posed the problem of whether the court, in a
default divorce in which the plaintiff husband had alleged the wife's
fitness and requested that she be awarded custody, could find the wife
not fit and grant custody to the husband. The wife alleged that an
award in excess of the prayer for relief was a denial of due process.
Respondent husband contended there is no property interest in the
custody of children protected by the due process provisions of the state
or federal constitutions. Although the trial court could question the
mother's fitness, despite the pleadings, it was held error to grant relief
beyond the prayer without giving the defendant notice and opportunity
to appear.
A related, but distinguishable, issue arose in the case of Hammond
v. Hammond."5 There a wife took her children to Idaho where she
obtained a divorce and was awarded custody. The husband-father did
not appear nor did the wife obtain personal service in Idaho. The hus-
band thereafter took possession of the children and the wife brought
a writ of habeas corpus in Washington. The husband elected to attack
collaterally the validity of the Idaho divorce, an issue which he lost,
and the court ordered the children to be returned to the wife. What
answer would the court have made had the husband contended that
the Idaho decree deprived him of his custodial rights without accord-
ing him due process? The United States Supreme Court, shortly
pay under an order of specific performance or as the result of non-performance of an
order similar to those in Decker and Brantley, a contempt citation is sought, can the
husband defend by showing a remarriage and his lack of means to perform because of
his new financial obligrtions? Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wn.2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939),
held that the remarried husband's earnings could be garnished for alimony and sup-
port obligations. Stafford v. Stafford, 10 WrL2d 649, 117 P.2d 753 (1941), held that
real property acquired by the husband and a new wife was not subject to execution
for such ante-nuptial obligations. Where do obligations bearing a "reasonable relation-
ship to the husband's duty to support," but not support orders, fit in this pattern?
311 RCW 26.08.160
112 RCW 26.08.170
"'s RCW 26.08.180. It may be noticed that the statutory sections cited in the
preceding two sections expressly refer to the "original divorce or annulment action"
while the present section refers only to the "original divorce action or proceedings."
Presumably these are intended to have the same meaning in each section.
14 47 Wn.2d 699, 289 P.2d 335 (1955).
115 45 Wn.2d 855, 278 P.2d 387 (1954).
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before the Hammond decision, held that Ohio was not compelled to give
full faith and credit to a Wisconsin default divorce custody award to
the father when the Wisconsin court did not have in personam juris-
diction of the wife." 6 In a case roughly the reverse of Hammond, the
wife took the children and left the marital domicile, Idaho, where the
husband later obtained an ex-parte default divorce awarding him cus-
tody. The Washington court apparently approved the conclusion of
the trial court that "the order of the Idaho court ... was not entitled
to full faith and credit, for the reason that it did not have jurisdiction
over the children at the time of the entry of the order.""" The dis-
tinction in the two cases lies in recognizing the difference between
jurisdiction resting upon the domicile of the plaintiff and children and
the due process protection arguably owing to the non-appearing parent.
The requirements for venue in custody modifications were decided
in White v. White,"' in which a wife, awarded custody in a divorce
granted in Spokane County but having moved to Franklin County,
moved that the husband's subsequent petition to modify custody be
transferred from Spokane to Franklin County. The basis for her
request was that RCW 26.08.160 provided that modification petitions
"may be brought in the county where said children are then residing,
or in the county where the parent ... who has the care, custody or
control of said children is then residing." Her motion for change of
venue was denied. The court pointed out that the 1949 act had
changed the words "shall be," in the old divorce statute, to the per-
missive form "may be." Accordingly, venue may be in any of three
possible counties: either the residence of the child or of the custodian,
by RCW 26.08.160; or the county which entered the original decree,
by virtue of its continuing jurisdiction.
The concept of continuing jurisdiction has proved useful to parties
in several other cases. The court has renewed its position of earlier
years that removal of the child from the state does not terminate the
Washington court's jurisdiction, even when the original decree author-
izes the removal by the parent given custody."9 This does not mean
that a further proceeding concerning custody may be initiated simply
116 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). It must be recognized that the case does
not say that Ohio could not, by comity, recognize the Wisconsin award. Would this
not leave control, in the Hammond case, with the Washington court?
11 In re Schreifels v. Schreifels, 47 Wn.2d 409, 412, 287 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1955).
The Washington court held that it could make a custody determination under the
husband's writ of habeas corpus and awarded custody to him on the merits of his
claim.
118 51 Wn.2d 652, 321 P.2d 262 (1958).
119 Sherwood v. Sherwood, 48 Wn.2d 128, 291 P.2d 674 (1955).
[VOL. 35
DIVORCE ACT OF 1949
by affidavit and motion. The statute requires a petition and this re-
quirement must be met.12 A problem of due process is present here
also, and there must be "such notice of the hearing upon the petition
... as the court shall determine." "2  The decision of one judge that
due process requirements were satisfied by notice to the attorney who
had represented the defendant in the original divorce, the attorney
having not withdrawn of record and the whereabouts of the defendant
not being known, was sustained.1 l
The statute authorizing the award of custody, RCW 26.08.110, per-
mits the order to be "modified, altered and revised by the court from
time to time as circumstances may require," and further provides "that
the trial court shall at all times including the pendency of any appeal,
have the power to grant any and all restraining orders that may be
necessary ... ." Although not expressly mentioned in this section, the
custody order is regarded as a "final" and appealable order. Deter-
minations not appealed become res judicata, and in this regard the
words "as circumstances require" have normally been taken to mean
circumstances which have arisen since the last custody determina-
tion." Perhaps the rigor of this rule has been somewhat relaxed by
the decision in Klettke v. Klettke, 2' where the court stated:
Thus a change in custody would seem justified under either of two
conditions, when (a) there has been a material change in conditions or
fitness of the parties, or (b) the welfare of the children would be pro-
moted thereby . . . the requirement that a change of conditions be
shown in order to modify custody provisions is simply another way of
stating that a showing must be made that the welfare and the best
interests of the children clearly require a change in custody. [Emphasis
by the court.]
Conditions sometimes change with rapidity. Review of custody
awards by appeal may involve considerable time. Prior to 1949 it had
been established that when an appeal of a divorce was perfected, the
superior court lost all jurisdiction and could not supersede the custody
provision."' The contention that this rule concerning loss of control by
the trial court pending appellate review was changed by the enactment
of the above quoted provision of the 1949 act, has not proved entirely
120 Schaefer v. Schaefer, 36 Wn.2d 514, 219 P.2d 114 (1950) ; State ex rel. Edwards
v. Superior Court, 37 Wn.2d 8, 221 P2d 518 (1950).
12. RCW 26.08.170.
122 Sweeny v. Sweeny, 43 Wn.2d 542, 262 P.2d 207 (1953).
123 Brim v. Struthers, 44 Wn.2d 833, 271 P.2d 441 (1954).
12448 Wn.2d 502, 505, 506, 294 P.2d 938, 940 (1956).
3
25 SeweU v. Sewell, 28 Wn.2d 394, 184 P.2d 76 (1947).
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successful. During pendency of the appeal the application for modifi-
cation must be addressed to the Supreme Court.126 However the trial
court does have power to enforce and implement its orders during such
period, and may retain some control by conditioning its award upon
the continued existence of specified conditions during the appeal
period." 7 A trial court may resort to the device of a temporary award
or modification of custody, granting a continuance and fixing a re-
hearing for some future date. 2 ' It is possible for a trial court to clarify
a prior custody provision without the formalities of a petition to
modify, 21 so long as its reasons for doing so are appropriate,' and it
is possible that this may be done pending appeal.' A writ of review,
or certiorari, is not to be used in this connection as both modifications
and clarifications are appealable orders. 2 If the time elapsed between
the entry of the order appealed and the remand from the appellate
court has been appreciable, it is appropriate for the trial court to re-
open the matter for further proceedings.' Petitions to modify, alleging
any facts which might support the prayer, are not to be dismissed on
the pleadings,2 4 and the petitioner who alleges prejudice and requests
a change of judges, is entitled to such change as a matter of right."2
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE AWARD OF CUSTODY
The question of who shall have custody of minor children, with the
accompanying problem of visitation privilege, has been the source of
a considerable volume of litigation in the decade being reviewed. Of
the 172 cass found in volumes 36 Wn.2d through 154 Wash. Dec.,
seventy-fot, )r over 43%o brought before the appellate court custody
and visita issues. This number does not include cases dealing
solely with , . support. Fifty-seven of these opinions were written
in the years 1950 through 1956, averaging slightly over eight cases
per year. Two of these custody problems became moot because of the
12 Walkow v. Walkow, 36 Wn.2d 510, 219 P.2d 108 (1950). The supreme court is
naturally hesitant to modify custody upon showings made by affidavits alone. Therefore
it will, when necessary, remand the question to the superior court to determine facts
and, within the scope of the remand, order modification.
127 Cooper v. Cooper, 39 Wn.2d 28, 234 P.2d 492 (1951).
128 Phillips v. Phillips, 52 Wn.2d 879, 329 P.2d 833 (1958).
129 Starkey v. Starkey, 40 Wn.2d 307, 242 P.2d 1048 (1952).
130 State exr rel. Hale v. Long, 36 Wn.2d 432, 218 P.2d 884 (1950).
131 Paulson v. Paulson, 37 Wn.2d 555, 225 P.2d 206 (1950). The question of
clarification during the pendency of appeal was discussed by the court, but under the
assignments of error it was not necessary to decide the issue.
1 2 Sutter v. Sutter, 51 Wn.2d 354, 318 P.2d 324 (1957).
132 Sweeny v. Sweeny, 52 Wn.2d 337, 234 P.2d 1096 (1958).
134 Joslin v. Joslin, 45 Wn.2d 357, 274 P.2d 847 (1954).
135 State ex rel. Mauerman v. Superior Court, 44 Wn.2d 828, 271 P.2d 435 (1954).
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disposition of the divorce upon appeal, and six arose on special writs
in the supreme court. The remaining forty-nine cases placed the cus-
tody determination of the trial judge before the supreme court for
review. In twenty-four instances, less than 50%, the trial judge was
affirmed while in twenty-five cases the supreme court remanded, modi-
fied, or reversed. This pattern changed abruptly in the period 1957
through 1959. During this latter period seventeen appeals were taken
from custody determinations, an average of slightly over six cases per
year, and in only two instances was the trial court's determination re-
versed. In all the remaining cases, save one which arose on special
writ, the appellate court affirmed.
A possible explanation for this phenomenon may be found in the
nature of the tests used to determine the award of custody and visita-
tion. A summary of principles is given in Chatwood v. Chatwood: 38
each case on its own facts; welfare of the child paramount, with
parental interests being subsidiary; mother preference, coupled with
age and sex of the child; acceptance of the trial court's findings as
accurate unless the record clearly preponderates against such finding;
and the need to give the trial court discretion because of his better
opportunity to evaluate credibility of witnesses and testimony. These
tests are of course general and nothing is contained in RCW 26.08.110
which provides specific guidance. Under these circumstances any ap-
pellate indication of liberality in reversing the decision of the trial
court will be an invitation to the losing party to appeal. The period
under review commenced with statements such as the Oie found in
Lundin v. Lundin:137 "When such discretion is exercisedl the court,
it should not be disturbed by this court unless it clearlW1j4pears that
there has been an abuse thereof." Within a short tin 7lovever, the
court was talking less in terms of abuse of discretion a*id more about
preponderance of evidence,"' s and by 1956 the language of the court
was: "Under the facts in the instant case, and considering the circum-
stances which these facts seem to present to us, we reach a different
conclusion from that of the trial court. It is our best judgment that
the case should be remanded. , 130
As indicated above the reversal in policy concerning review came in
136 44 Wn2d 233, 239, 266 P2d 782, 785 (1954).
137 42 Wn.2d 186, 187, 254 P.2d 460, 461 (1953).
138 Smith v. Smith, 45 Wn.2d 672, 277 P.2d 339 (1954) ; In re Walker, 43 Wn.2d
710, 263 P.2d 956 (1953).
139 Nedrow v. Nedrow, 48 Wn.2d 243, 292 P.2d 872 (1956). See also, Clarke v.
Clarke, 49 Wn2d 509, 304 P.2d 673 (1956).
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1957, apparently with the case of Patterson v. Patterson," ' where the
court returned to its former policy by quoting the following passage
from an earlier case:
Great weight should be given to the decision of the trial court in
custody matters because of the great advantage the trial court enjoys
over us in matters of trial atmosphere and opportunity to observe
witnesses personally, and to gauge first hand their candor and truth-
fulness.... Generally speaking, the crux of the latter principle, boldly
stated, is that the trial court is the forum where divorced parents, com-
peting for custody of their children, should expect to win their law
suits. In other words, on appeal, we are reluctant to disturb custody
disposition made by a trial court, and we will do so only upon a show-
ing of manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court.
That the court meant what it said seems indicated by the paucity of
reversals from that date. Continuation of this policy by the court would
seem an almost certain way to curb the number of appeals in the cus-
tody area.
If it is granted that the trial court is now the forum where custody
must be won, it becomes essential to notice the factors which have in-
fluenced awards.
It has been decided that RCW 26.08.110 and .160 do not give a
divorce court jurisdiction to determine custody of illegitimate chil-
dren, 4' although in another case a husband was awarded custody of
his wife's children by a prior marriage.'42 Racial characteristics have
been considered.' 4 ' Emotional instability"' and ill health'45 are fac-
tors of importance but the condition must be shown to have relation
to the welfare of the child.'46 Voluntary surrender of the child, by the
parent awarded custody, may be regarded as an indication of lack of
ability to meet the problems of custody4 . or as a lack of concern for
the child's welfare.' 8 Lack of interest in the child is not necessarily to
be determined, however, from a father's failure to make gifts or con-
tribute to the child's support when he has not been ordered to do so."'
140 51 Wn.2d 162, 164, 316 P.2d 902, 903 (1957).
141 Palmer v. Palmer, 42 Wn.2d 715, 258 P.2d 475 (1953).
14Eickerman v. Eickerman, 42 Wn.2d 165, 253 P.2d 962 (1953). The question ofjurisdiction was not raised in the case.
14 Ward v. Ward, 36 Wn.2d 143, 216 P.2d 755 (1950).
144Atkinson v. Atkinson, 38 Wn.2d 769, 231 P.2d 641 (1951); Cooper v. Cooper,
39 Wn.2d 28, 234 P.2d 492 (1951) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 50 Wn.2d 56, 308 P.2d 967(1957).
145 Siewert v. Livermore, 52 Wn.2d 375, 325 P.2d 293 (1958).
146 Guiles v. Guiles, 41 Wn.2d 377, 249 P.2d 368 (1952).
'
47 Cooper v. Cooper, 39 NWn.2d 786, 238 P.2d 1204 (1951).
148 Habick v. Habick, 44 Wn.2d 195, 266 P.2d 346 (1954).
149 Malfait v. Malfait, 154 Wash. Dec. 503, 341 P.2d 154 (1959).
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A lack of finances is normally not a compelling reason to modify a
prior custody award and a mother is not to be deprived of custody only
because she must work.150 In appraising the significance of these and
similar factors, the trial court must use its -discretion and not feel re-
stricted by a prior decision of the supreme court which relates to the
circumstances of the case of an earlier date.151
There is an understandable reluctance upon the part of the court to
approve awards of divided custody either in the sense of giving one
person legal custody and another the physical care,152 although such
has been approved,1 " or in the sense of alternating the custody be-
tween the parents,' 4 although the latter arrangements have also been
approved' 5 In one case, Reynolds v. Reynolds,' which involved a
wife who was trying to alienate the minor children's affection for the
father, the court resorted to alternating periods of custody because
the "welfare of the child will be served and respondent will have the
opportunity to combat any efforts of hostile parties to alienate the af-
fections of his children from him." As a dissenting opinion points out,
this hardly seems to keep the test of the child's welfare paramount.
In a case involving a wife who refused to cooperate with the husband
in his exercise of visitation privileges, and where the trial court granted
the husband's petition to modify the previous award and give him cus-
tody, the supreme court, with one judge dissenting, changed the order
and established joint custody. 5" Another type of division has occurred
in cases in which the welfare of the minor children was thought best
served by giving custody of some of the children to one party and cus-
tody of other children to another party. 8
Removal of minor children from the state, or the announced inten-
tion of removing them, has been a fairly frequent factor in custody
disputes. The initial award may prohibit removal. If it does not the
party having custody is not required to remain within the jurisdiction
even though the removal will effectively frustrate the visitation privi-
lege of the other parent. 9 The determination to grant or deny per-
150 Siewert v. Livermore, 52 Wn2d 375, 325 P.2d 293 (1958).
1r1 Sweeny v. Sweeny, 48 Wn.2d 872, 297 P.2d 610 (1956).
152 Wells v. Wells, 43 Wn2d 531, 261 P2d 971 (1953).
153 Ward v. Ward, 36 Wn.2d 143, 216 P.2d 755 (1950).
'51 Henson v. Henson, 47 Wn.2d 866, 289 P.2d 1034 (1955); Allen v. Allen 38
Wn2d 128, 228 P.2d 151 (1951).
'55 Brim v. Struthers, 44 Wn.2d 833, 271 P.2d 441 (1954).
156545 Wn.2d 394, 275 P.2d 421 (1954).
'157 Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wn2d 159, 222 P.2d 400 (1950).
"is Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951) ; Munroe v. Munroe, 49
Wn2d 453, 302 P.2d 961 (1956).
'
59 Nedrow v. Nedrow, 48 Wn.2d 243, 292 P.2d 872 (1956) ; Clarke v. Clarke, 49
Wn.2d 509, 304 P.2d 673 (1956).
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mission to remove a child from the state is based upon the usual test of
the child's best interests.'" Even the contemptuous act of removing a
child in open violation of the court's order does not, of itself, justify
a modification of custody without consideration of all other factors.'
This result is simply a variation of the principle that custody awards
should not be employed to punish an erring parent.'62
Children of an "age of discretion" may express their wishes in regard
to the custody arrangement.' It is probably not error for a trial judge
to refuse to consult the child'64 or, if error, probably not prejudicial. 5
If the children are consulted, their wishes are not controlling and in
one case, Thompson v. Thompson,'66 the court affirmed an award
which was vigorously opposed by the children. It seems established
practice for the children to be consulted in the judge's chambers. No
case has been found indicating the result of opposition to such interro-
gation, but counsel who consents may not later assign error based upon
the interview. 7 Inasmuch as the impressions received by the judge
during the interview may not appear in the record on appeal, it may
be difficult for the appellate court to review such custody awards. In
this connection the court has said: "We are in no position to say that
the trial judge abused his discretion. . . .We must, therefore, affirm
the order . ,, 168
The most tenacious concept in custody cases, other than the welfare
of the child, is that the child's mother has a better claim to custody
than does the father,' 69 especially when the children are of "tender
years." Undoubtedly this factor is persuasive, but as the court has
pointed out in repeated instances this claimed preferential status is itself
based on nothing more than the consideration of the welfare of the
child, and has no controlling effect.' A companion concept is that it
160 Wells v. Wells, 43 Wn.2d 531, 261 P.2d 971 (1953).
161 Sweeny v. Sweeny, 43 Wn.2d 542, 262 P.2d 207 (1953).
162 Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wn.2d 918, 226 P.2d 895 (1951).
163 Habich v. Habich, 44 Wn.2d 195, 266 P.2d 346 (1954) ; Henson v. Henson, 47
Wn.2d 866, 289 P.2d 1034 (1955).
164 Susnar v. Susnar, 45 Wn.2d 62, 273 P.2d 237 (1954).
165 Stratton v. Stratton, 53 Wn.2d 558, 335 P.2d 39 (1959).
166 45 Wn.2d 731, 277 P.2d 734 (1954).
167 Kain v. Kain, 51 Wn.2d 387, 318 P.2d 955 (1957).
168 Kain v. Kain, supra, p. 389. See also, Nelson v. Nelson, 43 Wn.2d 278, 260 P.2d
866 (1953). It would seem advisable, if counsel agrees to an interview of the children,
to insure that the results or impressions of the interview will appear as a part of the
record.
169 Guiles v. Guiles, 41 Wn.2d 377, 249 P.2d 368 (1952).
170 Habich v. Habich, 44 Wn.2d 195, 266 P.2d 346 (1954) ; Chatwood v. Chatwood,
44 Wn.2d 233, 266 P.2d 782 (1954) ; Christian v. Christian, 45 Wn.2d 387, 275 P.2d
422 (1954) ; Patterson v. Patterson, 51 Wn.2d 162, 316 P.2d 902 (1957) ; Siewert
v. Livermore, 52 Wn.2d 375, 325 P.2d 293 (1958) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 53 Wn.2d 107,
330 P.2d 1075 (1958) ; Applegate v. Applegate, 53 Wn.2d 635, 335 P.2d 595 (1959).
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is error for a trial court to award custody to anyone but a parent
unless the parent has been found not fit. Cases have been remanded
for failure to make findings relating to fitness, 7 especially where the
record fails to make clear what governed the custody award." 2 How-
ever where recitals in the record show the basis for the award a formal
finding is not required, at least not when the appellant has failed to
object and to move to vacate the judgment of the trial court.' In
any event it is now quite clear that a finding of unfitness is not essen-
tial to a determination to award custody to one other than a parent.'
Explicit findings of fact are desirable, especially in light of the re-
quirement of showing a change in circumstances since the last custody
determination.' In connection with the rule last mentioned it should
be noticed that even though a change of circumstances may be required
for a modification and factors previously considered are res judicata,
such prior events or facts may always be considered in a new deter-
mination regarding fitness.""
One additional factor has played a significant role in custody deter-
mination; proof of adultery. 7 At times the decisions seem to indicate
that proof of adultery is in itself an adequate showing of unfitness to
have custody, and in several instances an award to a mother, reversed
upon appeal, seems to have been governed by this consideration.' In
other cases, although regarded as a "weighty factor," adultery has been
considered simply as evidence bearing upon the question of fitness and
not per se a bar to an award of custody. 79
Custody determinations are difficult and often unsatisfactory of ne-
cessity. The question has naturally arisen whether the statute should
'7' Hansen v. Hansen, 43 Wn.2d 520, 262 P.2d 184 (1953).
172 Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wn.2d 918, 226 P.2d 895 (1951) ; Poffenroth v. Poffenroth,
49 Wn.2d 235, 299 P.2d 207 (1956).
173 Malfait v. Malfait, 154 Wash. Dec. 503, 341 P.2d 154 (1959).
17 Chatwood v. Chatwvood, 44 Wn2d 233, P2d 782 (1954) ; Henson v. Henson, 47
Wn.2d 866, 289 P.2d 1034 (1955) ; Applegate v. Applegate, 53 Wn.2d 635, 335 P.2d
595 (1959) ; Stratton v. Stratton, 53 Wn.2d 558, 335 P,2d 39 (1959).
175 Brim v. Struthers, 44 Wn.2d 833, 271 P.2d 441 (1954) ; Susnar v. Susnar, 45
Wn.2d 62, 273 P.2d 237 (1954).
'70 Gibson v. Olnhausen, 43 Wn.2d 803, 263 P.2d 954 (1953) ; Brim v. Struthers,
sup ra.7 7 Saffer v. Saffer, 42 Wn,2d 298, 254 P.2d 746 (1953).
17 8 Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn.2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951) ; Schilling v. Schilling,
42 Wn2d 105, 253 P.2d 952 (1953) ; Christian v. Christian, 45 Wn.2d 387, 275 P.2d
422 (1954). See also, In re Schreifels v. Schreifels, 47 Wn.2d 409, 287 P.2d 1001
(1955).
17 9 Bigelow v. Bigelow, 39 Wn.2d 824, 239 P.2d 317 (1951) ; Revier v. Revier, 48
Wn.2d 231, 292 P.2d 861 (1956); Nedrow v. Nedrow, 48 Wn.2d 243, 292 P.2d 872(1956) ; Annest v. Annest, 49 Wn.2d 62, 298 P.2d 483 (1956) ; Poffenroth v. Poffen-
roth, 49 Wn.2d 235, 299 P.2d 207 (1956) ; Westlake v. Westlake, 52 Wn2d 77, 323
P.2d 8 (1958).
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provide some other procedure for making these decisions. The supreme
court has permitted itself to speculate in this connection:
The disposition of child-custody matters involves some imponderables.
Among other things, human knowledge, and methods or procedures,
available for analyzing and disposing of the problem of what will be
most conducive to the best interest and welfare of children, have not
been reduced to an exact science, and may never be, considering the
nature of the problem and the variety of known and unknown factors
bearing upon it. In this connection, just in passing, it may be worth-
while to note that a strictly adversary proceeding, with the contending
parties, their relatives, friends, and supporters often testifying in a
diametrically opposite manner (particularly as to matters of opinion),
may not be too conducive to reaching the best and most ideal results in
custody cases.18° [Emphasis by the court.]
What the court had in mind seems reasonably clear: should there
be wider use of experts-juvenile authorities, social workers, psychia-
trists and similar persons? This possibility has not escaped the atten-
tion of lawyers and trial judges. In one case the child had been found
to be a dependent child before the divorce was started and the supreme
court was content to permit the divorce judge to defer to the juvenile
authorities concerning custody.' s However, a child may not, in a
divorce proceeding, be found dependent and placed under supervision
of the juvenile court. 2 The divorce court must retain jurisdiction
and make the custody determination. The hearing may be continued
to a later date however, with an intervening trial period of custody,'
and during the period of temporary custody the child may be placed
in a home for psychiatric observation and care, with the final deter-
muination to be influenced by the results.' Such studies, whether by
medical experts, probation officers, or home studies by a welfare de-
partment are not to be condoned if presented as "out-of-court" re-
ports."' "While we appreciate the value and necessity of such reports
under certain conditions and circumstances, they have no place in
adversary proceedings, except by agreement of the parties."' 86 It is
somewhat surprising to discover, at least upon the basis of reported
cases, that no attempt has been made to use the broader powers of the
family court in this regard.'
180 Chatwood v. Chatwood, 44 Wn.2d 233, 238, 266 P.2d 782, 785 (1954).
181 In re Walker, 43 Wn.2d 710, 263 P.2d 956 (1953).
182 Olson v. Olson, 46 Wn.2d 246, 280 P.2d 249, (1955).
183 Potter v. Potter, 46 Wn.2d 526, 282 P.2d 1052 (1955).
184 Munroe v. Munroe, 47 Wn.2d 391, 287 P.2d 482 (1955).
185 Lorang v. Lorang, 42 Wn.2d 539, 256 P.2d 481 (1953).
186 Lawrence v. Hosfield, 51 Wn.2d 157, 159, 316 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1957).
'87 RCW 26.12.010 et seq.
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It has long been recognized that custody need not be awarded to
either parent and a number of the cases cited above concern awards
to third parties. 88 Such a third party, having been awarded custody,
has standing to contest a petition to modify the award.' 9
One additional complication regarding custody has recently arisen.
The opinion in In re Candell,"9' a construction of RCW 26.32.040
which is a part of the adoption act, makes it clear that the consent of
a parent who is not expressly awarded custody, some visitation privi-
lege, or ordered to pay support, is not required in a subsequent adop-
tion of the child. The decision arose as the aftermath of a Colorado
default divorce which was silent as to the husband's future relation
to the child. It would appear mandatory for counsel hereafter to con-
sider this development when working out custody arrangements. It
may also be desirable for attorneys to review the position of former
clients who occupy the position of the husband in the Candell case.
Perhaps a modification, giving the petitioner any right, privilege, or
obligation regarding the child, will remove him from the "deprived"
category.
The enforcement of custody and visitation orders, considered apart
from child support problems, has not caused many appeals. Contempt
citations may be used to enforce restraining orders'9 and to test the
limits of the custody award." 2 Two interesting cases have considered
the problem of whether a wife, awarded custody on condition that she
desist from improper associations with certain persons, may be held
in contempt for violation of the order. 8 The contempt citation was
held, expressly in one case and by implication in the other, to be in
excess of the trial court's statutory authority and not supportable as
an exercise of inherent equitable power. The dearth of litigation in
this regard undoubtedly stems from the availability of the petition
to modify.
CHILD SUPPOPT
By statute"9 the property of a husband and wife is chargeable for
188 Ward v. Ward, 36 Wn2d 143, 216 P.2d 755 (1950) ; Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn.2d
102, 234 P2d 857 (1951) ; Saffer v. Saffer, 42 Wn.2d 298, 254 P.2d 746 (1953) ; Lun-
din v. Lundin, 42 Wn.2d 186, 254 P2d 460 (1953) ; Hansen v. Hansen, 43 Wn2d 520,
262 P.2d 184 (1953) ; Christian v. Christian, 45 Wn.2d 387, 275 P.2d 422 (1954).
189 Rawev. Rawe, 49 Wn.2d 672, 306 P.2d 200 (1957).
'90 154 Wash. Dec. 279, 340 P.2d 279 (1959).
191 Cogswell v. Cogswell, 50 Wn.2d 597, 313 P2d 364 (1957).
192 McArdle v. McArdle, 46 Wn.2d 268, 280 P.2d 675 (1955).
'93 Poffenroth v. Poffenroth, 49 Wn.2d 235, 299 P.2d 207 (1956) ; Pearce v. Pearce,
37 Wn.2d 918, 226 P.2d 895 (1951).
'94 RCW 26.16.205.
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family expenses and the parties may be sued jointly or separately in
relation to such obligations. The divorce act authorizes the court to
"make provision for . . . support and education of the minor chil-
dren. . . . " Such orders may be modified as circumstances require.
Failure of the divorce court to enter an order concerning support, or
its inability to do so for lack of in personam jurisdiction, not only
leaves the parties jointly and separately liable to third persons who
furnish support but also leaves open the question of inter sese contri-
bution.' Normally an order is entered by the trial court and appeals
take the form of disputes about fairness, need, ability, and abuse of
discretion. 6 A reading of the opinions handed down during the past
decade strongly suggests that not enough care is being exercised in
drafting agreements for clients and proposed orders for the court.
It is apparent that an order cannot be reviewed unless the record
gives the appellate court necessary information. 7 Several cases have
appeared involving orders to pay a periodic, unsegregated sum for the
support of several persons. If these parties are children who will attain
majority 9 ' upon successive dates, or if the obligor is relieved from his
duty to support one or more of the group for any reason, a question
of segregation inevitably arises. The first case of this nature arising
since 1949, State ex rel. Kibbe v. Rummel,'99 involved a husband who
reduced his monthly payments by half when his daughter married and
discontinued support entirely when the other child, a boy, reached age
eighteen. The court sustained an order of contempt, saying that the
husband's proper course of action would have been a petition to modify
and that he had no prerogative to scale down the payments of his
own accord. A second husband, under order to pay $80 per month
for the support of three children, reduced his payment by a third
during periods that one child-with the custodial wife's consent but
without a formal modification-lived with the father, another third
when a daughter married, and paid only the remaining one-third for
1'16 Scott v. Holcomb, 49 Wn.2d 387, 301 P.2d 1068 (1956). A husband abandoned
his wife in New York taking four of five children with him. Years later the wife ob-
tained a New York judgment against the husband for her expenses in rearing the one
child. Upon her attempt to enforce the judgment in Washington, the husband was
able to set-off his expenses in rearing the other children against the judgment of
the wife.
196 Lynch v. Lynch, 38 Wn.2d 437, 229 P.2d 885 (1951).
197 Nelson v. Nelson, 43 Wn.2d 278, 260 P.2d 886 (1953).19 Support duty terminates automatically when the child reaches the age of major-
ity as the divorce statute authorizes orders only in relation to minors. This was held
true even when the divorce order provided support for an incompetent son. Van Tinker
v. Van Tinker, 38 Wn.2d 390, 229 P.2d 333 (1951).199 36 Wn.2d 244, 217 P.2d 603 (1950).
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the child still in the wife's care. The wife sued to recover accrued
arrearages, alleging that she as trustee of the ordered support money
for the children could not agree to a reduction or waive the right to
payment. Perhaps so, the court indicated, but the duty to support
continues only as long as dependency exists and dependency may ter-
minate by attainment of majority, emancipation, marriage, or even
the acquisition of support from another source. The husband is en-
titled to show such termination and the question then is, was there an
abuse of trial court discretion in finding that the original order was
capable of such out-of-court segregation? Finding no abuse, the court
affirmed the lower court's judgment denying the wife recovery.200
A third husband, in the case of Koon v. Koon, °1 this time under an
order to pay a set amount for each child, elected not to make payments
to the wife during periods when the boys attended schools where their
total support was paid by the husband, or lived with him with the
wife's consent, or were in the military service. The wife sued for arrear-
ages. This case presented no problem of construction regarding segre-
gation of lump payments but rather whether the termination of
dependency, if proved, enabled the husband to discontinue the pay-
ments. Possibly the majority opinion says that the husband failed to
prove termination of dependency, the wife having always remained
prepared and willing to care for the children and actually having
cared for the one boy in military service who was permitted to live at
home. Again, the holding may be that the duty to pay continues un-
abated until relief is obtained by modification of the order. Judge
Finley, in a concurring opinion, indicates his belief that two conflict-
ing lines of authority exist. One group (of which Dittmar is the most
recent example) permits flexibility in determining if the duty to pay
ceased by reason of cessation of dependency; the other (of which the
Kibbe case is typical) denies such flexibility. Judge Finley would
prefer the former,0 2 but believes the court has chosen the latter. The
200 Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wn.2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956).
20150 Wn.2d 577, 313 P.2d 369 (1957).
202 If, in a case involving unsegregated payment for several persons, there is to be
a segregation, who is to decide upon the amount of the reduction? In a fairly old case,
Evans v. Evans, 116 Wash. 460, 199 Pac. 764 (1921), a husband was ordered to pay
lump periodic sums as child support and as alimony. He terminated payments upon
maturity of the daughter. The wife's action for arrearages was denied. She was held
to have the burden of segregating and, failing to do so, lost all claim against the hus-
band. The Kibbe case, supra note 199, distinguishes Evans by saying the wife was a
principal party in interest while in Kibbe she was seeking to recover only for the
benefit of the son, there being no alimony in the unsegregated award. One solution is
that used by the wife in Wages v. Wages, 39 Wn.2d 74, 234 P.2d 497 (1951), who,
under facts much like the Evans matter, brought a show cause order to have the hus-
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issue of whether or not the wife, having custody, can waive the chil-
dren's right to support payments, a problem alluded to in Dittmar but
not part of the holding, had already been resolved against the hus-
band in prior decisions"' and the court's dictum in Dittmar indicates
approval of the rule.
Wheeler v. Wheeler, the case last cited, also dealt with the question
of whether interruption of the husband's visitation privilege, granted
him by the divorce decree, effects his duty to pay support. The answer,
no, has been repeated several times.2 4 The reason for this is explained
in Corson v. Corson 5 where the trial court, in a modification pro-
ceeding initiated by the husband, suspended support of the obligation
until such time as the wife would again make visitation by the husband
possible by returning the child to Washington from Texas. This was
error, said the court on appeal, because support orders must be based
upon the child's need and the parent's ability to support, not upon the
availability or convenience of continued visitation.
When the obligor experiences difficulties with support payments,
his remedy is obviously a petition for modification. There must be a
showing of a change in circumstances since the last support deter-
mination (a task facilitated by findings and conclusions which indicate
with some clarity what the circumstances were at that time) such as
a change in earnings0 6 or in the incurring of greater obligations. 7
It is well settled that support obligations which have accrued may not
be modified retroactively.0 ' Although the court's decision not to per-
mit a wife to enforce arrearages by use of a contempt citation has been
held not to be a retroactive modification because she could still attempt
band held in contempt, permitting the court to make the segregation. Better and safer
yet would be a regular petition for modification at or before the date the child support
obligation terminates. Best of all would be a properly drawn order in the beginning.
203 Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wn.2d 159, 222 P.2d 400 (1950) ; Herzog v. Herzog, 23
Wn.2d 382, 161 P.2d 142 (1945).
204 Kain v. Kain, 51 Wn.2d 387, 318 P.2d 955 (1957), where the wife could have
permitted the visits but refused to do so; and, Gaidos v. Gaidos, 48 Wn.2d 276, 293
P.2d 388 (1956), where removal of the child to West Virginia made visitation im-
practicable.
205 46 Wn.2d 611, 283 P.2d 673 (1955). But, cf: Sanges v. Sanges, 44 Wn.2d 35,
265 P.2d 278 (1953), where a modification relieving the husband from future support
was affirmed, based upon the wife's action in removing the child to another state in open
violation of an order not to do so. The court said it was not shown that the modifica-
tion would adversely effect the child.
206 Bigelow v. Bigelow, 39 Wn.2d 824, 239 P.2d 317 (1951).
207 Hanson v. Hanson, 47 Wn.2d 439, 287 P.2d 879 (1955). The new financial bur-
dens, if not unavoidable, must be for appropriate matters. In the cited case the hus-
band-obligor had remarried and was legally obligated to support his new wife and
"socially, if not legally," responsible for the support of four stepchildren.
208 Kain v. Kain, 51 Wn.2d 387, 318 P.2d 955 (1957) ; Sanges v. Sanges, 44 Wn..2d
35, 265 P.2d 278 (1953) ; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wn.2d 159, 222 P.2d 400 (1950).
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collection by other means, °9 the same is not true of an order enjoining
the use of a writ of execution."' 0 Past due installments do not auto-
matically become judgment liens, 11 but they do become judgments
and the inherent right to enforce by usual means may not be denied.
On the other hand, the right to enforce may ultimately be barred by
operation of the statute of limitations.2
To obtain the judgment or order for child support and protect it
from modification is one problem; to enforce the obligation is an-
other. As just discussed it is possible, at the discretion of the court, to
use a contempt proceeding and, as a matter of right, to execute upon
accrued judgments. It is also possible to obtain a lien against specific
assets as security for the payments to fall due. Here, however, is an-
other area in which caution must be exercised in drafting the agree-
ment to be adopted by the court or the proposed order. In Goodsell v.
Goodsel2 8 the court adopted an agreement providing for occupancy
of the family home by the wife until the children, whose custody she
was awarded, should become adults. At that time the house was to be
sold and the proceeds divided between the spouses. The agreement,
and thus the order, also provided that the husband's interest was sub-
ject to a lien for the support payments. When the husband defaulted
in payment, the wife asserted the lien and had the premises sold. Then
came the surprise. The husband was successful in having the sale set
aside for, by terms of the agreement as construed by the court, the lien
could not be exercised until after the children had attained majority.
Such a bizzare result might be dismissed as an accident, but much the
same result was obtained with reference to an attempted garnishment
of the cash surrender value of an insurance policy on the life of the
obligor husband. 4 The agreement, again adopted by the divorce
court, ordered the husband to name the wife, and in certain contingen-
cies the children, as beneficiaries and not to borrow against or draw
upon the policy. The garnishment proceeding was ordered dismissed
because a cash surrender value, not being a present debt unless the
209 Corson v. Corson, 46 Wn.2d 611, 283 P2d 673 (1955).
210 Starkey v. Starkey, 40 Wn.2d 307, 242 P.2d 1048 (1952).
211 Swanson v. Graham, 27 Wn.2d 590, 179 P.2d 288 (1947).
212 Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wn.2d 159, 222 P,2d 400 (1950).
21138 Wn2d 135, 228 P2d 155 (1951).
214 Pick v. Pick, 154 Wash. Dec. 953, 345 P.2d 181 (1959). Two judges dissented
without opinion, and a third dissented for the reason that the court, having continuing
jurisdiction over the insurance policies in a proper enforcement proceeding ancillary
to the divorce, could make the cash surrender value available. For another case dealing
with a support order directing the father to provide insurance protection for a minor
son, see Silen v. Silen, 44 Wn.2d 884, 271 P.2d 674 (1954).
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holder elects to surrender, is not subject to garnishment. Assuming
that the court otherwise could compel the husband to exercise this
election or could surrender the policy for him, which power the court
questions, it may not do so in this case because of the support order's
prohibition of termination or impairment of the insurance protection.
One additional device available to secure payments for support
appears in Rentel v. Rentel.212 In that case the court ordered certain
property to be placed in trust for the purpose of sale, the proceeds to
be deposited in a bank under arrangements for periodic disbursements
to the wife.
DECREES OF NULLITY
The term annulment is generally employed to denote two entirely
different situations: voidable marriages which, prior to adoption of
the divorce act of 1949 and more particularly before Saville v. Sav-
ille,2 16 could be annulled ab initio at any time during the life of the
parties but not after the death of either;217 and void marriages which
may be declared null at any time." 8 Since the decision in Saville it
appears reasonably safe to conclude that annulment for a voidable
marriage is no longer an available remedy.219 The 1949 divorce act
authorizes a decree of nullity22 ° and provides that children conceived
or born during the existence of a marriage of record subsequently
declared void are legitimate children. 2 '
Only one case has dealt with the new provisions for void marriages,
but it is a case for major significance. In Jones v. Jones2 the court not
only approved suit money, attorney fees, and temporary alimony
awards, which it could do in any event by a prior decision, 2 ' but also
made an award of permanent alimony to the wife. In so doing the court
21039 Wn.2d 729, 238 P.2d 389 (1951).
21644 Wn.2d 793, 271 P.2d 432 (1954).
217 In- re Romano's Estate, 40 Wn.2d 796, 246 P.2d 501 (1952).
218 Not every person may assert the circumstances which demonstrate the nullity
of a marriage, however. In the case of In re Englund's Estate, 45 Wn.2d 708, 277 P.2d
717 (1954), the deceased had married a woman whose prior Idaho divorce was void
for lack of jurisdiction. The sister of the deceased, having no standing to collateraliy
attack the Idaho divorce, was unable to assert the nullity of the subsequent marriage
for the purpose of having the "wife" removed as administratrix of the deceased's
estate.
210 The Saville case expressly rejected this broad conclusion, saying only that where
the relief was sought upon grounds which would support a complaint for divorce, that
divorce must be used to the exclusion of annulment. Despite a contrary suggestion by
the court, it would appear that there are no grounds for annulment which would not
be grounds for a divorce.
220 RCW 26.08.050.
221 RCW 26.08.060.
222 48 Wn.2d 862, 296 P.2d 1010 (1956).
223 Davis v. Davis, 12 Wn.2d 499, 122 P.2d 497 (1942).
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has indicated that RCW 26.08.110 is as generally applicable to actions
for a decree of nullity as for divorce.
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The superior court, having the inherent powers of an equity court,
was able to award separate maintenance without statutory authoriza-
tion and frequently did so prior to 1949.224 Indeed there is still no
statutory provision authorizing the commencement of an action for
separate maintenance. The statute225 enacted in 1949 provides only
that: "If the court determines after trial that no divorce or annulment
shall be granted, it may enter a decree of separate maintenance .... "
It has been suggested that this statute was "designed to permit the
court to award separate maintenance in cases where only a divorce or
annulment was sought in the pleadings. Heretofore the court was with-
out the power to do this.122 1 Since a decree of separate maintenance
does not terminate the marital status, there is no requirement that
the plaintiff establish the same jurisdictional base of domicile that
would be required in actions for divorce.227 It may have been the in-
tended purpose of the legislation to authorize entry of separate main-
tenance even though the relief is not requested. The court has not been
required to determine whether such unsought relief may be awarded.228
It has been held that a wife may be granted separate maintenance upon
the amendment of her pleading although she, as defendant in a divorce
action, had initially sought no relief. 29
Whatever rule is ultimately announced regarding the pleading re-
quirement, it is clear that there are many cases in which divorce actions
will not support a decree of separate maintenance because of the differ-
ent grounds in the two remedies. Two recent decisions have held that
separate maintenance may be granted only when the wife establishes
224 Illustrative cases are: McGarry v. McGarry, 181 Wash. 689, 44 P.2d 816 (1935) ;
Schonbom v. Schonborn, 27 Wash. 421, 67 Pac. 987 (1902); Kimble v. Kimble, 17
Wash. 75, 49 Pac. 216 (1897).
225 RCW 26.08.120.
226 See the dissenting opinion in Stibbs v. Stibbs, 38 Wn.2d 565, 231 P.2d 310 (1951).
The quoted statement is a dictum.
227 State ex rel. Lloyd v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 347, 104 Pac. 771 (1909) ; Herr
v. Herr, 35 Wn. 2d 164, 211 P.2d 710 (1949).
228 The case of State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 36 Wn.2d 868, 220 P.2d 1081
(1950), and Sheldon v. Sheldon, 47 Wr.2d 699, 289 P.2d 335 (1955), should be noted
in this connection. The cases held, respectively, that an award of alimony and an
award of custody in a default divorce, neither being prayed for in the complaint, were
violative of due process requirements.
229 Metcalf v. Metcalf, 50 Wn2d 167, 310 P.2d 254 (1957). The court expressly
passed the question of whether such a decree could be entered without the request in
an amended pleading.
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both abandonment and non-support. 3 ' These decisions appear con-
sistent with earlier cases requiring an abandonment,23' but inconsistent
in requiring a showing of the additional factor of non-support . 2  The
present rule may be the product of a conscious judicial policy to limit
the use of separate maintenance. The court has demonstrated that
where divorce is requested by one spouse and separate maintenance
by the other, divorce is the appropriate remedy.233
The function of the decree is to provide support during the con-
tinued separation, not to make a permanent disposition of assets.
Cohn v. Cohn,"4 a case decided before the enactment of the new law,
held that a property division could not be made in separate main-
tenance action. The statute2 3 5 states that the court may "set aside prop-
erty for the benefit of the wife and children." By a footnote the court
has implied that the rule in the Cohn case has been changed,3 al-
though this issue was not necessary to resolve in the case being decided.
Attorney's fees and costs in actions to modify decrees of separate
maintenance are provided by statute, 37 but fees and costs pendente
lite are not. The court has held that the latter right exists independ-
ently of statute although the award is to be controlled by analogy to
RCW 26.08.090 and cases interpreting that section.23 '
SUIT COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
The allowance of suit costs and attorney's fees is governed by statute
for the initial trial and appeal "9 and in actions seeking modification
of orders.2"' Contingent fee arrangements are not permissable in di-
vorce litigation. 4 ' The purpose of the allowance is to permit effective
preparation and presentation of the case and an action may be stayed
until the plaintiff husband provides money necessary for the wife's
230 Manzer v. Manzer, 154 Wash. Dec. 801, 344 P.2d 212 (1959) ; Roberts v.
Roberts, 51 Wn.2d 499, 319 P.2d 545 (1957).
231 Anderson v. Anderson, 42 Wn.2d 370, 255 P.2d 373 (1953).
232 Best v. Best, 48 Wn. 2d 252, 292 P.2d 1061 (1956). A pre-1949 decision, Morden
v. Morden, 119 Wash. 176, 205 Pac. 377 (1922), is clearly in conflict with the recent
cases.
233 Fallin v. Fallin, 154 Wash. Dec. 445, 340 P.2d 791 (1959) ; Short v. Short, 154
Wash. Dec. 287, 340 P.2d 168 (1959).
234 4 Wn.2d 322, 103 P.2d 366 (1940).
235 RCW 26.08.120.
226 Jensen v. Jensen, 154 Wash. Dec. 588, 341 P.2d 882 (1959). The trial court
ordered the husband to pay one-half of his earnings to the wife and in no event less
than $400 per month. This was held to be an order for support, not an attempt to divide
the property.
237 RCW 26.08.190.
238 Stibbs v. Stibbs, 38 Wn.2d 565, 231 P.2d 310 (1951).
229 RCW 26.08.090.
240 RCW 26.08.190.24
'In re Smith, 42 Wn.2d 188, 254 P.2d 464 (1953).
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appearance. 41 In petitions to modify or on appeals the court may
award fees to either party." 3 The awards are in the discretion of the
court, 24 with the major requirement being that the wife establish a
need for the funds. 245 Need may be established where the husband
controls all available assets, even though the wife's share will eventu-
ally be substantial. 6 The amount awarded for costs and fees will be
influenced by the other orders concerning property division, support
and alimony2 7 as well as by the usual factors of time, difficulty of
the questions presented, the amount of the property involved, and
results obtained. 8
Despite the 1949 addition to RCW 26.08.090 authorizing the
supreme court to award fees and costs upon appeal, it has been held
that the superior court may also make such awards. "9 The supreme
court may make the award, but the request is to be made as part of
the appeal, not by subsequent separate motion.'
It had been decided prior to 1949 that an attorney may enforce an
order to pay attorney's fees by execution, 25 and the court recently
left open the possibility that the attorney may be able to use a con-
tempt citation for the same purpose.252
CONCLUSION
To attempt a brief summary of the decisions under the new divorce
act could only be misleading. Both the statutes and opinions empha-
size the significance of flexibility and discretion in meeting the con-
stantly varying factual patterns arising in family disputes. Under
such circumstances one becomes chary of general rules. Nonetheless
a few basic observations may be appropriate.
The major development has been the emphasis of divorce as the
242 State ex rel. Pearce v. Superior Court, 34 Wn2d 768, 209 P2d 906 (1949).
243 Gibson v. Von Olnhausen, 43 Wn.2d 803, 263 P.2d 954 (1953).
24-4 Malfait v. Malfait, 154 Wash. Dec. 503, 341 P.2d 154 (1959) ; Roberts v. Rob-
erts, 51 Wn. 2d 499, 319 P.2d 545 (1957) ; Schmidt v. Schmidt, 51 Wn2d 753, 321
P.2d 895 (1958) ; Platts v. Platts, 45 Wn.2d 853, 278 P.2d 679 (1954) ; Smith v. Smith,
45 Wn.2d 672, 277 P.2d 339 (1954).
245 Ans v. Akins, 51 Wn.2d 887, 322 P.2d 872 (1958); Blakey v. Blakey, 51
Wn2d 404, 318 P.2d 958 (1957) ; Kain v. Kain, 51 Wn2d 387, 318 P.2d 955 (1957) ;
Koon v. Koon, 50 Wn.2d 577, 313 P2d 369 (1957) ; Lynch v. Lynch, 38 Wn.2d 437, 229
P.2d 885 (1951).
240 Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 53 Wn2d 359, 333 P.2d 936 (1959).217 Johnson v. Johnson, 53 Wn.2d 107, 330 P.2d 1075 (1958); Wills v. Wills, 50
Wn.2d 439, 312 P.2d 661 (1957).
248 Abel v. Abel, 47 Wn2d 816, 289 P.2d 724 (1955).
249 Hilsenberg v. Hilsenberg, 154 Wash. Dec. 790, 344 P2d 214 (1959) ; State ex
rel. Akinson v. Church, 37 Wnl2d 814, 226 P2d 861 (1951).
250 Best v. Best, 49 Wn.2d 128, 298 P.2d 855 (1956).
251 Yoder v. Yoder, 105 Wash. 491, 178 Pac. 474 (1919).
252 Smith v. Smith, 53 Wn2d 744, 337 P.2d 51 (1959).
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preferred remedy for marital problems, a policy implemented by the
exclusion of annulment and the severe limitation of separate main-
tenance. The decree of nullity remains, however, and has actually
been made more attractive by the provisions legitimizing children and
making available full ancillary relief.
Proof of the subjective effect of cruelty has become the principal
problem in connection with grounds for divorce, although some ques-
tions in relation to "legal age" and five-year separation require clari-
fication. There are also open problems concerning the defenses of in-
sanity and condonation. Provocation as a defense is not new, but may
be assuming new importance.
The distinction between alimony and property division remains very
confusing, but with the development of a line of cases permitting con-
tempt enforcement of property awards the distinction has become
somewhat less crucial. The court has invited parties to exert more
control in this regard by skillful use of property settlement agreements.
Problems of custody, visitation, and child support are the matters
most litigated. The recently demonstrated determination of the appel-
late court to support the trial court's use of discretion in this area will
undoubtedly reduce the volume of appeals in the future. Welfare of
the child has emerged as the only test of real significance in custody
determinations, and the proper methods of using expert evidence and
interrogation of the child in this connection have been well illustrated.
Fault and the desire to punish erring spouses have become factors
of receding importance. The court has indicated that the power to
award costs and fees is to be exercised for the sole purpose of enabling
parties to have a full and fair hearing. There has been consistent insist-
ence upon due process, demonstrated especially by the court's refusal
to permit resolution of issues not expressly raised in pleadings upon
which defaulting defendants may have relied. The trend has been
away from summary dispositions or rigid, doctrinal treatment.
Trends toward flexibility increase the complexity of the lawyer's
work, and emphasis of discretion makes prediction of results difficult.
However, it is exactly these features which are most essential in do-
mestic relation cases. The cases have established major policies under
the act and have made it usable. It is the lawyer's responsibility to
use it well.
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